








































Exploring an uncharted market: Evidence on the
unsecured Swiss franc money market
Basil Guggenheim, Sébastien Kraenzlin and Silvio SchumacherThe views expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the 
Swiss National Bank. Working Papers describe research in progress. Their aim is to elicit comments and to 
further debate.
Copyright ©
The Swiss National Bank (SNB) respects all third-party rights, in particular rights relating to works protected
by copyright (information or data, wordings and depictions, to the extent that these are of an individual
character).
SNB publications containing a reference to a copyright (© Swiss National Bank/SNB, Zurich/year, or similar) 
may, under copyright law, only be used (reproduced, used via the internet, etc.) for non-commercial purposes 
and provided that the source is mentioned. Their use for commercial purposes is only permitted with the 
prior express consent of the SNB.
General information and data published without reference to a copyright may be used without mentioning 
the source.
To the extent that the information and data clearly derive from outside sources, the users of such information 
and data are obliged to respect any existing copyrights and to obtain the right of use from the relevant 
outside source themselves.
Limitation of liability
The SNB accepts no responsibility for any information it provides. Under no circumstances will it accept any 
liability for losses or damage which may result from the use of such information. This limitation of liability 
applies, in particular, to the topicality, accuracy, validity and availability of the information.
ISSN 1660-7716 (printed version)
ISSN 1660-7724 (online version)
© 2011 by Swiss National Bank, Börsenstrasse 15, P.O. Box, CH-8022 Zurich1
Exploring an uncharted market: Evidence on the
unsecured Swiss franc money market
Basil Guggenheim, S´ ebastien Kraenzlin and Silvio Schumacher∗
Swiss National Bank†
B¨ orsenstrasse 15, P.O. Box, CH-Z¨ urich
December 15, 2010
Abstract
To date, various central banks have lacked detailed statistical ev-
idence on developments in the unsecured interbank money market.
Furﬁne (1999) introduced the idea of calculating unsecured overnight
interbank lending by using data of a RTGS system. Based on data from
the Swiss payment system (SIC) we developed an algorithm to identify
unsecured interbank loans in Swiss francs. In contrast to Furﬁne (1999)
we also identify longer-term transactions. We thereby gain a deeper
insight on the size and structure of the unsecured interbank money
market in Swiss francs. This is the ﬁrst time that SIC data have been
used to identify transactions and market rates in the unsecured Swiss
franc money market. Overall, the estimates show that after the col-
lapse of Lehman Brothers loss of conﬁdence led to a freezing-up of the
market for several months and a decrease in daily turnover.
JEL-Codes: E40, E42, E44
Keywords: unsecured interbank money market, development,
money market turmoil, ﬁnancial stability, Switzerland
∗We are indebted to Jean-Pierre Danthine, Martina Glaser, Karl Hug, Mario Laubscher,
Thomas Nellen and Rolf Zgraggen for valuable discussions and support in obtaining the
data. The authors also thank the anonymous referee for valuable comments and sugges-
tions.
First version: 18 June 2010, submitted in November 2010.
†The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessar-
ily represent those of the Swiss National Bank. E-mails: basil.guggenheim@snb.ch, se-
bastien.kraenzlin@snb.ch, silvio.schumacher@snb.ch2
1 Introduction
The ﬁnancial crisis that began in 2007 aﬀected a number of funding mar-
kets, among them the secured and the unsecured interbank money markets.
The phase after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, in
particular, was marked by a considerable loss in counterparty conﬁdence.
According to market participants, this loss of conﬁdence resulted in a shift
from the unsecured to the secured market.
The Swiss National Bank (SNB) implements its monetary policy via repo
transactions on the electronic trading platform of Eurex Zurich Ltd. As this
platform is also used for repo transactions between banks, the SNB is able to
monitor developments on the interbank repo market closely. It is fair to say
that the Swiss franc repo market has proved to be a crisis-resistant source of
liquidity, thanks to the consistent minimisation of counterparty risks.1 To
date, however, the SNB has lacked adequate data on developments in the
unsecured interbank money market.
Data from the Swiss RTGS system, Swiss Interbank Clearing (SIC), pro-
vides an opportunity to evaluate unsecured interbank loans without relying
on data surveys with money market participants and brokers. SIC is the core
payment system in Switzerland for settling large value and retail payments.
This is the ﬁrst time that RTGS data have been used for the identiﬁcation
of transactions and market rates in the unsecured Swiss franc money mar-
ket. The identiﬁcation algorithm was used to identify unsecured interbank
transactions with a maturity of up to three months. SIC transaction data
is available since 2005, which allows us to examine the period before and
during the ﬁnancial market crisis. This data not only gives us the oppor-
tunity to estimate transactions in the unsecured interbank money market
but also the chance to evaluate whether volume in the Swiss franc money
market actually fell sharply or not. With the data at hand, we can further
test whether the Libor ﬁxings represent the actual market rate or not.
Our estimates show that both, daily turnover and outstanding volume
in the unsecured Swiss franc money market (overnight to three months),
declined heavily during the ﬁnancial market crisis. After the collapse of
Lehman Brothers loss of conﬁdence even led to a freezing-up of the market
for several months. Yet, it has not recovered fully. The decline of the activity
in this mostly domestic market was mainly due to departing counterparties.
We take this as an evidence that cash providers refrained from lending out
money on an unsecured basis. We also observe a shift from the unsecured
to the secured interbank money market during the crisis. To date, we have
found no evidence for a reversal in the relative importance of these two
money market segments.
1See Kraenzlin/von Scarpatetti (2010) for a detailed analysis on the repo market.3
In March 2008, Libor panel banks were accused of talking up their cred-
itworthiness by reporting lower rates than what they actually had to pay
in order to avoid negative signals about their reﬁnancing conditions. These
accusations were mainly raised for the Libor ﬁxings in US-Dollar. With the
data at hand, we ﬁnd evidence that the Libor rates in Swiss franc, and hence
also the three-month Swiss franc Libor, adequately reﬂected conditions on
the unsecured money market. We can thus conclude that on average, Swiss
franc Libor panel banks did not talk up their creditworthiness by reporting
lower rates than what they actually paid.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a short overview
on the related literature. In the subsequent section, the methodology applied
for the Swiss data as well as potential drawbacks of the methodology are
presented and discussed. A description on the properties of the dataset are
given in section 4. Section 5 analyses the turnover, outstanding volume as
well as the number of participants on the unsecured money market in Swiss
francs. In section 6 the question is addressed if the Libor rates correspond
to prices paid. In the subsequent section the development of the unsecured
money market is compared to that of the Swiss franc repo market. Section
8 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Furﬁne (1999) introduced the idea of calculating unsecured overnight inter-
bank lending by using data of a RTGS system. He established the basic
algorithm for the identiﬁcation of loans which were subsequently used in a
number of related papers. Using Fedwire data from the ﬁrst quarter of 1998
interbank loans with a maturity of one day (overnight) were identiﬁed as
follows: Payments greater than USD 1 million with fairly round numbers
(rounded to the nearest integer of USD 100,000) are ﬂagged as potential
candidates for the initial payment of an interbank loan. On the following
working day, payments between the same parties but in opposite direction,
with a slightly bigger amount than the candidate, are earmarked as a po-
tential repayment. Provided that the slightly larger amount qualiﬁes for
a reasonable interest rate of an overnight loan – i.e. within a range of 50
basis points below and above the federal funds rate2 – the two payments are
identiﬁed as an unsecured interbank loan. Furﬁne (1999) found, that on a
daily average about 24% of the Fedwire funds transfer value or about USD
2Furﬁne (1999), p. 26: ”What was assumed to be a reasonable rate of interest varied
each day depending on standard, publicly available measures of the federal funds rate.
Such measures record each day’s 11:00 rate, closing rate, and eﬀective (value-weighted)
funds rate. As interest rates charged are likely to vary across transactions, payments
that implied an interest rate ranging from 50 basis points below the minimum of these
three published rates and the Federal Reserve’s target rate to 50 basis points above the
maximum of these four rates were allowed.”4
144 billion per day accounted for unsecured interbank loans. In addition, he
stated that larger institutions are more active, regardless of whether they
are cash taker or provider. In general, small banks tended to lend funds
to large banks. Nevertheless small banks also acted on both sides of the
market. Furﬁne (1999) ﬁnally found that the majority of the payments took
place between 4 and 6pm, whereas repayments were evenly spread during
the day.
Furﬁne (2002) re-examined the unsecured interbank money market dur-
ing the ﬁnancial market disruptions in autumn 1998, when Russia defaulted
on its sovereign debt. He found that the interest rate did not deviate from
the federal funds target rate. Further there was neither evidence for a de-
crease in the volume in the federal funds market nor for an increase in credit
spreads depending on the counterparty characteristics. He concluded that
the individual institutions seemed to be able to achieve the desired level of
liquidity also during the crisis.
Demiralp et al. (2004) also analyzed the federal funds market but ex-
tended Furﬁne’s methodology by applying a ﬁlter on implied interest rates.
Therefore an interest rate had to be in units of 1/32 percentage points or in
whole basis points. In addition they lowered the minimum size of loans to
USD 50,000 and widened the range for acceptable interest rates. The total
value of identiﬁed loans was close to Furﬁne’s calculations and therefore,
the widening of interest rate range and size threshold did not lead to major
diﬀerences.
Millard/Polenghi (2004) examined the unsecured overnight interbank
money market in pound sterling by applying Furﬁne’s algorithm on the data
from the Sterling payment system (CHAPS3). Similar to Furﬁne (1999) they
set the size threshold to GBP 1 million. They found evidence that unse-
cured overnight loans accounted to about GBP 22 billion on average, which
is about 11% of the ﬂows in CHAPS Sterling. Since in CHAPS Sterling
only 13 participants act as settlement banks, the identiﬁcation of the ﬁnal
beneﬁciary and originating party behind an interbank transaction was not
possible. To their surprise, they found that four CHAPS Sterling mem-
bers accounted for almost all payments which were identiﬁed as overnight
loans. Furthermore, Millard/Polenghi (2004) examined the time stamp of
each payment and found that these were fairly evenly spread throughout the
day. Therefore they concluded that ”the overnight interbank loan market
does not greatly increase the impact of an operational event in CHAPS Ster-
ling at the moment, at least from the point of view of the system operators.”
A further contribution to the calculation of unsecured interbank loans
was made by Hendry and Kamhi (2007) by applying Furﬁne’s algorithm to
3CHAPS stands for Clearing House Automated Payment System.5
the large value payment system of Canada (LVTS4). Analog to Demiralp et
al. (2004) they extend the algorithm by introducing a ﬁlter on the implied
interest rate. Thus, only loans with an interest rate in units of half a basis
point are considered as eligible. Their data shows, that the overnight interest
rate on average only lay one basis point below the Bank of Canada’s target
overnight rate. The average size of a loan is CAD 50 million. Further
they note that big banks lend more in total value and frequency but at
lower rates and smaller tickets. Examining the time of settlements, they
ﬁnd a diﬀerent pattern as for overall payments in LVTS. Generally, the
number of loans gradually increases during the day, peaks at around 4pm and
sharply declines during the last trading hour. Finally they try to estimate
the overnight interest rate determinants through a regression analysis. They
ﬁnd amongst others a positive relationship between interest rate and size of
value which proved to be non-linear. They take this as an evidence that
”very large borrowers are likely to get preferential treatment by the banks
as part of an ongoing relationship”. Further they ﬁnd, that loans concluded
in the morning are most expensive and small banks get cheaper loans when
borrowing from big banks.
All of the literature mentioned above used the basis algorithm introduced
by Furﬁne (1999). Some of the authors extended the method by introduc-
ing diﬀerent ﬁlters or widening the interest rate range or lowering the size
threshold. However, all of them tried to identify unsecured overnight loans
only. Longer terms were not taken into account.
Most recently Heijmans et al.(2010) applied an extended Furﬁne algo-
rithm on TARGET2 data and identiﬁed unsecured interbank loans with a
maturity up to one year. They tested the algorithm with diﬀerent search
bands5. Thus, in order to reduce the under-identiﬁcation of interbank loans,
they widened search band during periods of large volatility in interest rates.
In addition, to reduce the over-identiﬁcation of transactions for certain ma-
turities they appointed a higher priority to most likely maturities (one day,
full weeks and full months) and to shorter terms, since the market is the
deepest in shorter maturities. They ﬁnd evidence of a signiﬁcant decrease
in the Dutch part of the euro unsecured interbank money market. The
hypothesis that a shift from longer to shorter term lending took place
during the ﬁnancial market crisis could not be conﬁrmed. However they
found a signiﬁcant increase in the spread and volatility of the interest rates.
Heijmans et al.(2010) conclude that the algorithm should also be used in
order to monitor the unsecured interbank money market and hence as an
early warning indicator for sudden shocks.
4LVTS stands for Large Value Transfer System.
5We deﬁne a search band as the interest rate interval within which calculated interest
rates qualify as a reasonable interest rate for an unsecured interbank transaction.6
3 Methodology applied for Swiss data
As in the latest contribution mentioned above, we expand the algorithm
in order to not only identify day-to-day transactions (overnight, Tom-Next
and Spot-Next)6, but also longer maturities (up to twelve months). The
algorithm was written in MATLAB.
The algorithm starts by searching large (at least CHF 500,000) and round
(integer steps of CHF 100,000) payments ﬂowing from bank A to B. Subse-
quently, the algorithm searches for payments which ﬂow back from bank B to
A. For overnight transactions, for example, the reverse payment would need
to take place on the subsequent working day. If there is a payment ﬂowing
back, we calculate the interest rate by using the value on the purchase day
and the value on the repurchase day. If this interest rate is reasonable, or in
other words, if it is within a certain search band, an overnight transaction
is identiﬁed.
3.1 Methodology in detail
The ﬁrst step is by ﬁltering the dataset to include only payments with values
higher than or equal CHF 500,000 and payments that are marked as bank-
to-bank payment7. Furthermore, all payments from or to Continued Link
Settlement (CLS) and SNB accounts are excluded. In addition payments
stemming from SECOM, the Swiss security settlement system, as well as
repo transactions were canceled out. To each remaining payment a unique
payment number was then attached.
In order to identify not only day-to-day transactions but also transac-
tions with a longer term (1W, 2W, 3W, 1M, 2M, 3M, 6M, 9M, and 12M)
we replicate a trading calendar. We can thereby identify for each maturity
the purchase and the corresponding repurchase date. We did not consider
transactions with non-standardized terms.
At ﬁrst, the algorithm starts with the search for day-to-day transactions.
If day-to-day transactions are found, the respective two payments, one for
the purchase date and one for the repurchase date, are blocked. As soon
as the whole dataset is analyzed for one maturity, the dataset is analyzed
for the next longer maturity. By beginning with shorter terms we account
for the higher activity in shorter terms and in turn also reduce the prob-
abilities of over-identifying longer terms (see below discussion on potential
6Tom-Next and Spot-Next stand for transactions with a maturity of one day. In con-
trast to overnight transactions, the value date for Tom-Next (Spot-Next) transactions is
one (two) working day(s) after conclusion of the transaction.
7In the SIC system both large value and retail payments are settled. In order to identify
bank-to-bank payments they are earmarked with a corresponding message type. Therefore
we are able to identify such payments unambiguously.7
drawbacks). Within the day-to-day segment, one can distinguish between
overnight, Tom-Next and Spot-Next transactions. In contrast to overnight
transactions, the value date for Tom-Next (Spot-Next) transactions is one
(two) working day(s) after conclusion of the transaction. With the payment
system data at hand we have the information on the entry date as well as
the value of the transaction. Hence, we are able distinguish between the
three day-to-day maturities. As banks do not need to enter a Spot-Next or
Tom-Next transaction necessarily on the date it had been concluded, there
is a potential of categorizing a Spot-Next and Tom-Next transaction as an
overnight transaction. Therefore, we subsequently refer to all three types of
transactions as day-to-day transactions.
Subsequently for every day of the dataset, the algorithm calculates in-
terest rates between payments with round numbers (initial payments) and
the speciﬁc payments on the repurchase date. Only payments which ﬂow
between the same two banks are considered. In case there are several repur-
chase payments for the same initial payment, we use the repurchase payment
with the smallest diﬀerence between the calculated interest rate and the re-
spective Libor rate. If the calculated interest rate is within a search band,
we mark the two payments as an unsecured interbank transaction.
The search band is set to 15 basis points above and below the respective
Libor rate for the speciﬁc working day.8 In contrast to previous work (see
section 2), we deﬁne a more narrow search band in order not to overestimate
interbank loans.9 However, in order to account for day-speciﬁc volatility,
e.g. end of month or last day of the minimum reserve requirement period,
the width of the search band is adjusted. On days with a high volatility
the width of the search band is a function of the intraday volatility. As
a measure for the intraday volatility we use the intraday volatility of the
overnight rate on the Swiss franc repo market, as these transactions are
reported to the SNB on a daily basis. In total, on around 5% of the days
under consideration, the volatility of the overnight repo rate was higher
than 15 basis points. On these days each side of the search band for day-
to-day transactions was set to the level of the intraday volatility of the repo
rate. For all other terms, the search band was only widened if the overnight
8The Libor is ﬁxed for 15 maturities ranging from day-to-day to one year on a daily
basis. In contrast to other currencies, the day-to-day Libor ﬁxing in the Swiss franc reﬂects
the spot-next maturity (T+2), i.e. the value date is two working days after the business
date. For the overnight rate at date T the spot-next Libor ﬁxing at date T-2 was used as
reference rate.
9To test for stability, we recalculated the dataset with diﬀerent band widths. By
doubling the band, i.e. using 30bp, the average turnover increased roughly by CHF 10
million per term and per day. Overall, this leads to an increase of roughly CHF 100
million. Overnight transactions increased slightly stronger than longer maturities. As
wider search bands increase the probability of over-identifying transactions, we decided to
set the band width to 15 basis points above and below the respective Libor rate.8
volatility was above 30 basis points. On these days each side of the search
band was set to half of the level of the overnight volatility. The search
band is a fraction of the intraday volatility rather than a multiple, as the
intraday volatility of longer-term transactions is smaller than for day-to-
day transactions. Overall, the search band for longer-term transactions was
widened in less than 1% of the analyzed days.
Payments related to the Swiss franc repo market are also settled via SIC
and are known to the SNB. As we are able to identify such payments un-
ambiguously, they can be used to test the algorithm. Tests have shown that
the bulk of the payments related to the Swiss franc repo market, namely
90%, could be identiﬁed. The matching quote was best for transactions
with a maturity longer than one day (day-to-day transactions). Day-to-day
transactions are harder to identify due to the high interest rate volatility.
Despite the fact that the search band is widened on days with high volatil-
ity, the search band cannot cover the entire volatility in day-to-day rates.
Consequently, the algorithm under-identiﬁed day-to-day repo transactions.
3.2 Potential drawbacks of the methodology
The identiﬁcation of unsecured interbank transactions using Swiss payment
system data has four potential drawbacks, namely (i) the over-identiﬁcation
of longer-term transactions, (ii) the under-identiﬁcation of day-to-day trans-
actions, (iii) the determination of ﬁnal beneﬁciary and originating bank and
(iv) the splitting of large payments in SIC.
First, longer-term transactions are more likely to be over-identiﬁed than
shorter-term transactions. This is due to the increasing size of the interest
rate payment with the maturity. While the search band does not increase
with the maturity, the interest rate payment increases with the maturity.
Hence, a larger interest rate payment leads to more payments within the
search band. In order to evaluate the relevance of this potential drawback,
we calculate the kernel distribution of the diﬀerence between estimated (ac-
tual) interest rates and the related Libor rate. A nearly uniform kernel
distribution indicates that the algorithm identiﬁed interbank payments ir-
respective of the search band. The kernel graphics for each maturity are in
section 6 and in the annex. We ﬁnd that transactions with a higher maturity
than three months show a nearly uniformly distributed kernel. Hence, we
excluded identiﬁed transactions with a maturity of more than three months
from the sample.
Second, the volatility in day-to-day rates in Switzerland is in general
higher than for longer-term rates. Among others, the higher volatility re-
sults from the fact that the SNB conducts its monetary policy by steering
the three-month Libor instead of a day-to-day interest rate. In order to
account for the higher volatility the width of the search band is a function9
of the intraday volatility. Nevertheless, the widening of the search band
does not cover the entire volatility in day-to-day rates. Hence, day-to-day
transactions are more likely to be under-identiﬁed.
Third, there are still a number of money market players, especially such
domiciled abroad, who do not have direct access to SIC. Many of these banks
use a correspondent bank (e.g. UBS, Credit Suisse or a cantonal bank) to
settle their transactions. Therefore we are not able to identify the ﬁnal
beneﬁciary and originating bank in all cases.
Fourth, there is a technical issue with respect to SIC payments. Money
market transactions in SIC must be split into segments of CHF 100 million
each. On the repayment date, interest may be paid back on one segment of
the loan only, instead of averaging out the interest payment on all segments.
Consequently, payments larger than CHF 100 million might be underesti-
mated and, in addition, could be identiﬁed as long-term loans due to the
higher interest rate.
4 Dataset
In this paper data from the Swiss payment system (SIC) is used. SIC is
the core payment system in Switzerland for settling large value and retail
payments. There are over 370 participants, of whom roughly one-third are
domiciled outside Switzerland. Another third of the participants are Swiss
branches of foreign banks and foreign-controlled banks.
The sample covers all payments settled in SIC from 1 January 2005 to
1 October 2010. Overall, the dataset consist of roughly 2 billion payments.
On average 1.3 million payments with a total value of CHF 195 billion were
settled per day. The majority of the payments (99%) possess a value of less
than CHF 500’000. This mainly stems from the fact that SIC is not only
used for bank-to-bank payments but also for retail payments. Excluding all
retail payments, transactions stemming from securities settlements (includ-
ing repo) and CLS payments as well as all transactions with the SNB, 6.1
million payments remain in the dataset. These payments were subsequently
used to identify unsecured interbank transactions. Of these potential pay-
ments we classiﬁed 12.4% as payments resulting from unsecured interbank
transactions. In total, we identiﬁed 377,916 unsecured interbank transac-
tions. As the dataset also covers the period of ﬁnancial market turmoil that
started in August 2007, we can analyze to what extent the unsecured in-
terbank money market was aﬀected by the loss of conﬁdence. Subsequently
we deﬁne three periods, (i) the time before the outbreak of the crisis on
August 8, 2007, (ii) the phase after the outbreak of the ﬁnancial crisis until
the collapse of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008 and (iii) the phase
from mid September 2008 to the end of the sample. We divide the crisis10
into two diﬀerent periods, as loss in counterparty conﬁdence considerable
increased after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008.
day-to-day 1W 2W 3W 1M 2M 3M Total
2005 209 33 8 4 23 9 17 303
2006 200 32 9 4 28 11 19 303
2007 163 27 8 5 27 11 21 262
2008 102 16 6 4 19 9 18 175
2009 72 16 6 3 7 5 9 118
2010 48 11 4 3 5 4 8 83
Table 1: Daily average number of identiﬁed transactions
Table 1 shows that the algorithm on average identiﬁed 200 unsecured
interbank transaction per day. The majority of the transactions (65%) are
identiﬁed as day-to-day transactions. The 1W to 1M maturity segment
accounts for 25% (50 transactions) of identiﬁed transactions, whereas 25
transactions on average were classiﬁed into the longer maturity segment
(2M to 3M). Table 1 further shows that the number of identiﬁed transac-
tions decreased substantially after 2007. In 2005, 300 unsecured interbank
transactions per day were found on average, whereas in 2009 and 2010 the
value lay two-thirds below the 2005 level. In Figure 1 we see that roughly 5%
of SIC turnover can be ascribed to unsecured interbank transactions. This
share gradually decreased from August 8, 2008. Starting from September
2008 the share lay below 2% of the total SIC turnover. This is due to the
fact that daily turnover in the unsecured Swiss franc money market declined
whereas the activity in SIC remained stable.
Figure 1: Share of unsecured interbank transactions of SIC turnover
In Figure 2 we see that the majority of identiﬁed transactions possess a11
size of CHF 50 or 100 million. Transactions with a size of more than CHF
100 million are seldom concluded.10 We further evidence that longer-term
transactions (2M-3M) in general own a size of less than or equal CHF 50
million, whereas transactions with a maturity between 1W and 1M mainly
feature volumes of either CHF 50 or CHF 100 million. Moreover, we ﬁnd that
the size of a transaction is typically concentrated at integers of CHF 5 million
(Figure 2). Overall, we can conclude that the average value per transaction
decreases with increasing maturity. The average size of a transaction lay
at CHF 21 million. For day-to-day transactions it lay at roughly CHF 27
million, whereas the size lay at approximately CHF 22 and 17 million for
the 1W-1M and 2M-3M segment, respectively.
As mentioned previously, the algorithm was extended in order to identify
interbank transactions with a maturity of up to twelve months. In order to
determine the robustness of the methodology we took the diﬀerence between
estimated (actual) interest rates and the related Libor rate and calculated
the Kernel distribution function. A narrow distribution indicates that there
is a clustering of prices paid, irrespective of the methodology and search band
chosen. If prices are distributed uniformly no clear pattern is identiﬁed and
estimates are likely to be misleading. In general we ﬁnd that transactions
with a maturity of less than or equal to three months are non-uniformly
distributed, whereas transactions with a maturity above three months show
a nearly uniformly distributed kernel (see Figures in annex). Transactions
with a maturity of more than three months are thus likely to be misleading
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Figure 2: Volume distribution (in CHF billion)
10This provides evidence that banks comply with SIC’s non-binding recommendation
that payments shall not be above a value of CHF 100 million.
11A three month interbank transaction can only be identiﬁed if the payment as well as
the repayment are covered in the data set. The sample covers all payments in SIC from
1 January 2005 to 1 October 2010. As transactions with a maturity of more than three
months are not further outlined, transactions can consequently only be identiﬁed between
1 April 2005 and 30 June 2010.12
5 Developments in the unsecured money market
Turnover and outstanding volume
Before the crisis, daily turnover in the unsecured Swiss franc money market
stood at approximately CHF 8 billion (see Figure 3 and Table 2). The day-
to-day market segment (overnight, Tom-Next and Spot-Next) accounted for
70% on average, whereas 7% of total turnover can be ascribed to the longer-
term segment (2M to 3M).12
Figure 3: Turnover (20 day moving average)
During the ﬁrst phase of the crisis (August 2007 to September 2008),
we see a reduction in activity to a level of roughly CHF 5 billion. How-
ever, estimates show that, after several months, conﬁdence between banks
was restored and daily turnover stabilised at CHF 6 billion. The shares of
the three market maturity segments remained more or less constant. We
can thus conclude that no clear trend towards shorter-term maturities took
place.
After the collapse of Lehman Brothers – in other words, at the height of
the crisis – loss of conﬁdence led to a freezing-up of the market for several
months. During the ﬁrst two months, daily turnover lay below CHF 2 bil-
lion. In mid December 2008 – when the SNB started to provide the banking
system with generous amounts of liquidity – activity in the unsecured in-
terbank money market turned up slightly (CHF 3,5 billion). However, by
January 2009, total turnover had only reached the CHF 4 billion level. We
conclude that both the EURCHF swaps (in concert with the ECB, as well
12Note that ON, TN, SN, 1W, 2W, 3W, 1M, 2M and 3M maturities were analysed.
In the following, we refer to these maturities when talking of total turnover and total
outstanding volume.13
as the Polish and Hungarian central banks) and the SNB’s longer-term repo
transactions (up to one year) restored conﬁdence to some extent and that
this gave rise to increased lending activity. However, the pick-up in activity
was short-lived. We ascribe the fall-back in activity ﬁrst, to a low level of
interest rates, which made interbank lending unattractive and second, to a
more balanced liquidity distribution between banks, which rendered it su-
perﬂuous. The day-to-day market segment still accounted for 70% of the
total turnover on average. Consequently, we do not note a clear shift towards
shorter-term maturities in relative terms in either of the sub-periods.
day-to-day 1W 2W 3W 1M 2M 3M Total
2005 6’281 1’025 169 63 364 137 270 8’309
2006 5’940 1’049 172 88 447 173 273 8’141
2007 4’999 765 160 98 416 165 323 6’926
2008 3’260 397 121 69 333 154 293 4’626
2009 2’447 507 144 72 174 93 160 3’597
2010 1’460 296 83 58 146 92 161 2’296
Table 2: Daily average turnover of identiﬁed transactions (in million CHF)
In May 2010 we again evidence a drop in daily turnover to a level below
CHF 2 billion. The drop in activity coincides with the increased uncertainty
caused by anxiety about Greece’s excessive national debt. A proposal of
austerity measures and the ratiﬁcation of the EU/IMF loan package helped
restore investor and counterparty conﬁdence. Nevertheless, the volume has
not picked-up substantially and stabilized at a level slightly above CHF 2
billion. In May 2010 the level of Swiss franc liquidity resulting from the
SNB’s foreign exchange interventions increased to CHF 100 billion – sub-
stantially above the pre-crisis level of CHF 5 billion.13 The high level of
Swiss franc liquidity led to a more balanced liquidity distribution among
market participants making interbank trading superﬂuous. The more bal-
anced liquidity distribution as well as the fact that the 3-month Libor, for
example, reached its all-time low of 7.7 basis points beginning June 2010 –
which goes along with a low return – may thus have contributed to the drop
and limited resurgence in activity.
The computation of the outstanding volume reveals that approximately
CHF 45-50 billion had been lent between banks on an unsecured basis before
the collapse of Lehmann Brothers (see Figure 4). Until September 2008, the
amount outstanding remained constant and the average time to maturity
stood at approximately 30 days.
13See SNB (2010), table A1 for a development of the sight deposits.14
Figure 4: Outstanding volume (20 day moving average)
The drop in turnover after mid September 2008 is also reﬂected in overall
outstanding volume. In April 2009, for example, outstanding volume stood
at CHF 25 billion – which was roughly half of the estimated outstanding
volume before the crisis. The drop in turnover in May 2010 in turn only
had a negligible eﬀect on the outstanding volume (minus CHF 5 billion
on average).14 The average time to maturity decreased only slightly, from
30 days to approximately 25 days. The share of the longer-term maturity
segment (2M-3M) remained at roughly 60% of the outstanding volume.
Participants
Depending on their activity in the unsecured interbank money market, par-
ticipants can be classiﬁed into cash providers, cash takers or so-called market
makers. A cash provider is a bank, which is traditionally long in Swiss francs
and is seeking an investment opportunity. A cash taker is a bank, which
is traditionally short in Swiss francs or a third currency and is seeking a
reﬁnancing opportunity.15 Finally, we deﬁne market participants to be mar-
ket makers if they are both cash providers and cash takers. In general,
a market maker is deﬁned as a market participant, that provides bid and
ask prices for a given maturity. Contrary to this deﬁnition, we classify a
market participant as market maker if the participant ﬁgures as cash taker
as well as cash provider irrespective of whether the turnover results from
14The outstanding volume only reacts with a lag on a drop in turnover as longer-term
remain in the outstanding volume until repayment.
15Banks with a reﬁnancing need in euros can, for example, fund euros via a Swiss
franc repo transaction and subsequently swap the Swiss francs in to euros via an fx-
swap. The willingness to fund euros via Swiss franc repo transactions depends on
the repo rate charged relative to direct funding in the euro repo market. See also
Kraenzlin/Schlegel (2009).15
same-maturity transactions or not.
Before the crisis, the unsecured money market was characterized by a
large number of cash providers facing a much smaller number of cash takers
(up to 80 active cash providers versus about 30 cash takers). Roughly 60
(10) banks were pure cash providers (cash takers), whereas roughly 20 banks
ﬁgured as market maker (see Figure 5). The market makers were almost
exclusively banks domiciled in Switzerland. In total an average of 90 banks
were active per day. The numbers were relatively stable until mid 2007.
Estimates show that small and medium-sized market players appear as cash
providers disproportionally often and that large market players often borrow
money from these banks.
Figure 5: Number of cash takers and cash providers
After mid 2007, the overall number of active participants fell by roughly
40%. Lack of conﬁdence in other market participants’ creditworthiness is
most likely the main explanation. The lack of conﬁdence – which peaked
after Lehmann Brothers collapsed – led to a substantial decline, not only in
turnover, but also in the number of active banks. This number plummeted
to fewer than 30 in October 2008. Shortly after, the number of active banks
per day rose again slightly to 40 banks. However the increase was short-lived
and the number of active banks steadily decreased and stabilized at a very
low level compared to the situation before the crisis (20 banks). The decline
is mainly ascribed to departing cash providers. We take this as evidence
that cash providers refrained from lending out money on an unsecured basis
either because of increased risk perception and/or low returns of lending
resulting from a low interest rate level. The drop in supply led to excess
demand for Swiss francs in the unsecured money market, which eventually
led to an increase in market rates in mid October 2008.16
16Cf. Auer/Kraenzlin (2009) for a discussion on measures taken by the SNB to overcome16
We also evidence that the number of active market makers dropped from
20 to ﬁve banks after August 2007. The decline can be ascribed to various
factors: Firstly, banks aimed at reducing the size of their balance sheets
(deleveraging). In Switzerland, the netting of open interbank transactions
can only be eﬀected under certain circumstances.17 The reduced netting
possibilities induced market participants to withdraw from market making.
Secondly, the SNB lowered the target level of the three-month Libor from
2.75% to 0.25% within two months. The low level of the interest rate, the
ﬂat interest rate curve as well as expectations of an extended period of
low interest rates rendered term transformation redundant. Thirdly, many
banks had to cut back their counterparty credit limits, limiting the scope of
term transformation.
Figure 6: Number of participants by domicile
Finally Figure 6 demonstrates that only few banks domiciled outside
Switzerland are active in the unsecured interbank money market. Inter-
estingly, the number of banks domiciled abroad remained relatively stable
throughout the period of observation. The small number of borrowers, the
fact that large market players often borrow money and only few banks out-
side Switzerland participate in the unsecured money market may result from
correspondent banking. Acting as correspondent banks, large market play-
ers receive Swiss francs on behalf of a third bank. These third banks are
mainly domiciled abroad and borrow Swiss francs.
tension in Swiss franc market interest rates.
17According to Art. 9 of the Guidelines on Accounting Standards (published by the
Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority, FINMA) netting on claims and liabilities
is only permitted if the underlying transactions are of the same type and denominated
in the same currency, and are concluded between the same counterparties, and if the
maturity date of the claims is before or equal to that of the liabilities.17
Net borrowing and lending
Participants on the unsecured interbank money market can be analysed in
terms of whether they are net cash providers or cash takers over one business
day. A bank is a net cash taker (provider) if it borrows more (less) money
than it lends. Figure 7 reveals that the group ”big banks and Raiﬀeisen
banks”, are net cash takers, while the others are cash providers on average.
Before the crisis, for example, all cantonal banks together lent roughly CHF
1.4 billion but borrowed only CHF 650 million, therefore they were net cash
providers, at CHF 750 million. The group ”big banks and Raiﬀeisen banks”
appear as net cash takers, among others, as they act as correspondent banks
for a large number of banks domiciled abroad. Interestingly, banks domiciled
abroad are net cash providers. This stands in contrast to the secured inter-
bank money market, where banks domiciled abroad are almost exclusively
cash takers (see Kraenzlin/von Scarpatetti (2010)). The discrepancy can be
explained by the fact that banks domiciled abroad can clear via correspon-
dent banks in the unsecured money market, whereas this is not possible in
the Swiss franc repo market.18 Hence the so-called cross-border segment for
the unsecured money market cannot be identiﬁed accurately. Furthermore,
the few banks domiciled abroad – which are direct clearer – are mainly
located in countries with high ﬁduciary investments and hence seek for a
short-term investment opportunity of excess Swiss franc balances.19 This
presumption is supported by the fact that approximately 88% of their lend-
ing has a maturity of less than or equal one week. Consequently these banks
ﬁgure as net cash providers in the very short-term maturity segment of the
unsecured interbank money market.
During the period of observation, most individual bank categories re-
mained on the same side, i.e. they remained either net cash takers or net
cash providers. However, at the end of the second phase of the crisis, the
group ”big banks and Raiﬀeisen banks” switched to the net lender side,
while the cantonal banks switched to the net borrower side. This may be
ascribed to the fact that several banks domiciled abroad switched their cor-
respondent bank functions for receiving Swiss francs to the cantonal banks.
Also, the importance of the various cash providers changed substantially
throughout the period examined. According to our estimates, the ’other
banks’ category (mostly banks in Liechtenstein) and the cantonal banks
advanced to major net cash providers during the ﬁrst phase of the crisis.
While the ’other banks’ still played an important role on the cash providing
side in the second phase, the cantonal banks became the predominant cash
taker. Interestingly, stock exchange banks and later on also foreign banks
(domiciled in Switzerland), scaled back their activity.
18In December 2009, for example, 25 banks domiciled abroad were active on the Swiss
franc repo market.
19See SNB (2009), Table 38 on data regarding ﬁduciary business by country.18
Figure 7: Net borrowing and lending (20 day moving average)
6 Do Libor rates correspond to prices paid?
The panel for the Swiss franc Libor comprises 12 banks, including Credit
Suisse and UBS. The Libor is computed as a trimmed mean of the rates
contributed, where only the middle two quartiles are considered in calculat-
ing the Libor. In March 2008, Libor panel banks were accused of talking
up their creditworthiness by reporting lower rates than what they actually
had to pay in order to avoid negative signals about their reﬁnancing condi-
tions.20 In the following we investigate the representativeness of the Swiss
franc Libor rate based on the kernel distribution function for the day-to-day,
1W and 3M maturity. The kernel distribution function is estimated for the
diﬀerence between actual prices paid and the respective Libor ﬁxing. The
distribution indicates whether there is a clear concentration of prices paid
and if these prices, on average, were above or below the Libor ﬁxing. Figures
8, 9 and 10 plot the Kernel distribution functions for the three maturities
and for the three phases. The estimated kernel distribution functions for
the remaining maturities can be found in the annex.
20According to the economics literature (Schlegel (2009)), a bank’s reluctance to con-
tribute above average (i.e. the eﬀective Libor rate) is probably non-linear, i.e. a rate
slightly above average is perceived as much less unpleasant than a rate far above average.
Cf. also Millard/Polenghi (2004)) and Tett(2008).19
Day-to-day maturity
For the day-to-day segment the distribution of the spreads between actual
interest rates and the related Libor shows that – irrespective of the width of
the interest rate band – three-quarters of transactions lie within the band of
-10 to +10 basis points from Libor. For the period before the crisis the kernel
distribution is skewed to the right and shows a high concentration at a level
of -5 basis points. This indicates that before the crisis the majority of the
banks in general paid 5 basis points below the Libor ﬁxing. During the ﬁrst
phase of the crisis we see that the distribution function has become slightly
more skewed to the right peaking at a level of -10 basis points. Interestingly
the Kernel distribution does not continuously decrease but rises again at
integer intervals of ﬁve basis points (i.e. at -5, 0, 5 and 10 basis points). This
indicates that, in general, a cash provider distinguished between the cash
taker’s creditworthiness and accordingly adjusted the interest rate. After
the collapse of Lehman brothers we ﬁnd that the distribution function is no
longer skewed to the right, but rather equally distributed around zero. This
in turn, shows that the majority of the banks were no longer able to reﬁnance
themselves below the Libor ﬁxing. Furthermore, the revolving peak pattern
has disappeared. This does not mean that no systematic price diﬀerentiation
had been undertaken with respect to the cash taker’s creditworthiness, but
rather that the range of ’successful’ cash takers became narrower or that
the low level of interest rates hampered a systematic price diﬀerentiation.
A narrower range of cash takers in turn implies a smaller heterogeneity in









-0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
Figure 8: Kernel distribution: day-to-day transactions
1W maturity
For the period before the crisis the kernel distribution in the 1W maturity
is skewed to the right and shows a very high concentration at a level of20
-7.5 basis points. This concentration is highest for all maturities under
consideration (see annex). This indicates that before the crisis the majority
of the banks in general paid roughly 8 basis points below the 1W Libor ﬁxing.
During the ﬁrst phase of the crisis we see that the distribution function has
become ’ﬂatter’ and is slightly more skewed to the right peaking at a level
of -11 basis points. Hence during the ﬁrst phase we ﬁnd evidence that
several banks were able to reﬁnance themselves at lower prices – compared
to the respective Libor rate – than before August 8, 2008. However, the
’ﬂatter’ distribution and the second peak at the Libor level demonstrates
that cash providers are likely to have diﬀerentiated between cash takers,
in other words, not all banks were able to reﬁnance themselves at interest
rates below Libor. Furthermore the ’ﬂatter’ distribution indicates a higher
volatility in prices paid due to increased uncertainties during the crisis. After
the collapse of Lehman brothers we ﬁnd that the distribution function is no
longer skewed to the right, but rather equally distributed around zero. This
in turn, shows that the majority of the banks were no longer able to reﬁnance
themselves below the Libor ﬁxing.
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Figure 9: Kernel distribution: 1W transactions
3M maturity
Before the crisis the kernel distribution for the 3M maturity is skewed to
the right. On average, banks paid one basis point below the three-month
Libor ﬁxing. Compared to the other maturities the peak is nearest to zero,
which means that the prices paid for unsecured interbank transactions were
concluded nearest to the Libor ﬁxing. Since the start of the crisis we observe
a slight increase in prices and in the volatility of the spread, leading to a
’ﬂatter’ distribution function. We ﬁnd two bulks, one at a level of ten
basis points and the other at one basis point below the three-month Libor
ﬁxing, indicating a segmentation into a more and a less creditworthy cash
taker group. Starting from the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the kernel21
distribution is more evenly distributed around zero. On a number of days,
the diﬀerence to Libor amounted to as much as 20 basis points. The more
uniform distribution may be taken as indication that the algorithm identiﬁed
interbank payments irrespective of the search band and hence over-identiﬁed
3M transactions. In addition this more uniform distribution indicates a
higher volatility in prices paid due to increased uncertainties during the
crisis. However, after the collapse of Lehman Brothers the three-month
Libor rate fell below 15 basis points, limiting the search band on the lower
side with the zero lower bound. The search band was limited by the zero
lower bound in 42 cases. This, on the contrary, counteracts the potential
drawback of over-identiﬁcation. In general, one needs to bear in mind that
the kernel distribution for the 3M maturity for the period after the collapse
of Lehman Brothers is based on fewer transactions, hampering the validity
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Figure 10: Kernel distribution: 3M transactions
Overall, our estimates for the interbank data show that prices paid are
not uniformly distributed. This provides evidence that the identiﬁed prices
are representative. Further, we ﬁnd that before the crisis the level of interest
rate paid was about ﬁve to ten basis points below the corresponding Libor.
During the ﬁrst phase of the crisis the level shifted even farther below Li-
bor, whereas after the collapse of Lehman Brothers it moved towards the
Libor. However, the average interest rates paid seldom reached a level above
Libor. Therefore, we can conclude that throughout the crisis the Libor ﬁx-
ings, including the three-month Libor, adequately reﬂected conditions on
the unsecured money market. Accusations that banks talked up their cred-
itworthiness by reporting lower rates than what they actually had to pay,
in order to avoid negative signals about their reﬁnancing conditions, can be
refuted on the basis of the data to hand.22
7 Comparison to secured Swiss franc money mar-
ket
Day-to-day interbank transactions are mainly used by banks to balance
short-term liquidity ﬂuctuations. Due to their short-term nature, these
transactions play a subordinate role in the reﬁnancing of loans to non-banks.
In contrast to longer-term maturities, counterparty credit risk considerations
play an inferior role in determining the interest rate.
Figure 11: Secured versus unsecured money market
In general, turnover in the day-to-day market segment is the highest of
all maturities. This applies for the unsecured money market (70%) as well
as for the repo market (77%). Estimates show that the unsecured money
market reached an average turnover of roughly CHF 6 billion compared to
CHF 4 billion in the repo market (see Figure 11). Already in the ﬁrst phase
of the crisis, we observed diametrically opposite developments in the two
money market segments. Average turnover in the unsecured money market
ﬂuctuated below the CHF 5 billion line, whereas it increased steadily in the
repo market. This divergence was most pronounced at the height of the
crisis in September 2008: a real boom in the repo market, while turnover in
the unsecured money market plummeted to roughly CHF 600 million.
Thereafter activity also decreased in the repo market, mainly because
of the generous liquidity provision by the SNB and the low level of interest
rates. Nevertheless we observe that turnover in the day-to-day segment of
the repo market stabilised at a level of roughly CHF 5 to 6 billion, which is
above the pre-crisis level and more than double the day-to-day turnover in
the unsecured money market.
In May 2010 we again evidence a drop in daily turnover in the repo as23
well as a in the unsecured money market. The drop in activity coincides
with the high level of Swiss franc liquidity resulting from the SNB’s foreign
exchange interventions (see also discussion in section 5). The increased
uncertainty caused by anxiety about Greece’s excessive national debt may
also have contributed to the decline in turnover on the unsecured money
market. As counterparty credit risk considerations play a subordinated role
in the repo market this explanation does however not apply for the repo
market.
Overall we observe a shift from the unsecured to the secured interbank
money market during the crisis. Up to now we ﬁnd no evidence for a reversal
in the relative importance of these two markets. Based on the turnover data
we can further assess that the Swiss franc repo market has proven to be a
crisis-resistant reﬁnancing source (see Kraenzlin/von Scarpatetti (2010) for
a detailed discussion on the resilience of the Swiss franc repo market during
the ﬁnancial crisis).
8 Conclusion
To date, the SNB has lacked evidence on developments in the unsecured
interbank money market. Data from the Swiss RTGS system, however, give
the opportunity not only to estimate volume in the unsecured interbank
money market but also to test whether the three-month Swiss franc Libor
– which serves as the operational target for the SNB – represents the actual
market rate or not.
Estimates show that, before the crisis, daily turnover in the unsecured
Swiss franc money market (ON to 3M) stood at approximately CHF 8 bil-
lion. During the ﬁrst phase of the crisis, we see a reduction in activity to a
level of roughly CHF 6 billion. After the collapse of Lehman Brothers – in
other words, at the height of the crisis – loss of conﬁdence led to a freezing-
up of the market for several months and a decrease in daily turnover to less
than CHF 2 billion. The drop in turnover after mid September 2008 is also
reﬂected in the overall outstanding volume. However, we do not observe a
clear shift towards shorter-term maturities in relative terms in either of the
sub-periods. The decline in market activity was mainly due to departing
counterparties. In addition, we observe a shift from the unsecured to the
secured interbank money market during the crisis. We take this as evidence
that cash providers refrained from lending out money on an unsecured ba-
sis mainly because of increased risk perception and less to low returns of
lending resulting from a low interest rate level.
Estimates also show that, throughout the crisis, the Libor rates and
hence also the three-month Libor adequately reﬂected conditions on the
unsecured money market. Accusations that banks talked up their credit-24
worthiness by reporting lower rates than what they actually had to pay, in
order to avoid negative signals about their reﬁnancing conditions, can be
refuted on the basis of the data to hand.
With the data at hand, future research can be done in order to evaluate,
for example, the network eﬃciency of the unsecured interbank money mar-
ket, the robustness of bank relationships during the ﬁnancial crisis and if
certain market participants had been systematically avoided. Furthermore
with the data, the representativeness of the Libor rates can be tested, by
comparing the rates the Libor panel banks contributed with the rates that
they ultimately paid for unsecured interbank loans.25
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